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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING-PAYMENT OF CHKECK IN EXCIANGE
WHEN DRAWEE CANNOT PAY IN CASH-Where a drawee bank,
which on presentment of a check for payment did not have enough
cash on hand to pay it, gave the collecting bank a draft on a corres-
pondent in payment, which was later dishonored, it was held that
there was no legal payment and the debt for which the check was
given was not discharged. Moore & Dawson v. Highway Eng. &
Const. Co.'
In the course of the opinion it was asserted that there was a vital
distinction 'between the facts of this case and those of the recent
case of Dewey v. Margolis, 2 which was referred to in a recent number
of this review.3 The difference on the facts is that the drawee bank
in the Dewey case paid the check by a draft on another bank at a
time when it could have paid in cash. And it was there held that
as to the drawer the check was paid.
The decision in the case under comment is entirely sound. If
the collecting agent had demanded cash it would have gotten no
'better results. The facts of the Dewey case present a much more
controversial question. It appeared that neither the drawer nor the
payee were at fault but one of them was bound to lose. As a matter
of legal theory it is difficult to say who should be the loser. The
payee was not responsible for the unauthorized acts of his agent
such as accepting anything other than cash in payment.4 The
drawer would rely on the proposition that since he had undertaken
only that the check be paid in cash upon presentment he was dis-
charged when without his concurrence the payee's agent accepted
a draft instead of cash in payment. The payee does have a remedy
against his agent for any loss consequent upon his unauthorized
conduct,5 which is not open to the drawer, and thus it might be
'Moore & Dawson v. Highway Eng. & Const. Co., 196 N. C. 142, 144
S. E. 692 (1928).
1195 N. C. 307, 142 S. E. 22 (1928).
(1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 466, 470.
4 Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 S. Ct. 196, 31 A. L. R.
1261 (1923).
'Ibid. The North Carolina court follows the so-called Massachusetts rule
that the collecting bank is directly responsible to the owner of the check as
distinguished from the New York rule that the primary bank in the chain
of collection is an independent contractor. Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd,
142 N. C. 187, 55 S. E. 95 (1906). The two rules are clearly stated in First
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urged as a practical matter that the loss should fall upon the payee.
Yet would not that tend to discourage creditors from accepting checks
on small-town banks?o And under such a holding is it not con-
ceivable that the court would rule against the payees in a number
of separate cases like the Dewey case where their checks had been
presented on the same day and paid in exchange when the drawee had
enough cash on hand to pay any one of them but not enough to pay
all of them or one check equal in amount to all of them? There is
certainly an area of doubt in working out the theory behind such a
decision.
It does not appear that in the Dewey case the drawee bank was
insolvent when the check was presented. Common observation leads
one to suggest that it was in such condition as a matter of fact even
though it continued business. Counsel for the payee in such cases
might well investigate the point and, if possible, show that the drawee
was insolvent at the time of presentment. In such case the loss
would already have fallen upon the drawer. An insolvent bank
has no right to pay out funds, though if it does pay out cash to one
ignorant of the insolvency the payment is irrevocable.1
It may be urged with force that the notorious practise among
banks to pay checks in exchange ought to be recognized in law. In
such case the collecting bank would not be in default in taking
exchange. And the drawer being bound by the usage, unless he had
specified that payment be made in cash only, would not be discharged
if the exchange draft were dishonored.8 It would probably require
legislation to effect the change.
J. B. FORDHAM.
National Bank of Denver v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo.,
6 F. (2d) 339, 341 (C. C. A. 8th., 1925).
'It is worthy of note that the primary bank in the chain of collection usually
undertakes to limit the liability of itself and its correspondents for accepting
drafts in payment by stipulation on its deposit slips. A common stipulation
reads: "This bank or its correspondents may send items, directly or indirectly
to any bank including the payor, and accept its draft or credit as conditional
payment in lieu of cash." If binding such a stipulation would leave the payee
without a remedy even as against the collecting bank.
'Hayes v. Beardsley, 136 N. Y. 299, 32 N. E. 855 (1892).
"And this result has been reached in a case under the North Carolina
statute, N. C. Code of 1927, §220 (aa), which gives drawee banks the option
to pay all checks drawn upon them in exchange unless it be specified thereon
to the contrary "when any such check is presented by or through any Federal
Reserve Bank, Post Office, or Express Company, or any respective agent there-
of." Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
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BANKS AND BANKING-POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKS TO ENGAGE
IN BUSINESS-ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTs-C Bank, acting as financial
agent of B County, executed a bond, pursuant to statute, in favor of
B County, with A Bank as surety, the A Bank to receive part of the
deposits of said county as consideration for becoming surety. Upon
default of C Bank, A was sued as surety. Held: A national bank's
contract of suretyship is ultra vires and void. Board of Commis-
sioners of Brunswick County v. Bank of Southport.'
A corporation is limited in its activities to the powers granted by
its charter, or by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is organized,
or to those powers incidental to the full enjoyment of those expressly
granted.2 This applies to banks organized under the National Bank-
ing Act, which act defines the powers expressly given and those
incidental thereto.3 Under incidental powers the courts have allowed
the national banks multifarious privileges. They have been per-
mitted to make contracts of guaranty or suretyship, for their own
benefit, when necessary to dispose of some property taken as security
for money loaned, 4 to warrant commercial paper that passes through
their hands,5 and the like. A contract of suretyship or guaranty
for the benefit of another, even for valuable consideration, is held
to be outside the powers of a national bank, unless such a contract
is necessary to protect the bank, for "banks are not eleemosynary
institutions. They may lend their money, but not their credit." 6
Where a bank has made loans, and later takes over other property
as additional security, rather than force banks to dump on the market
property which has been pledged to them as additional security for
loans previously made, the courts have allowed them to take over
the property and so handle it as to make it profitable. Thus, a bank
has been allowed to take over a road construction contract after the
-196 N. C. 198, 145 S. E. 227 (1928).
'Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24,
11 S. Ct. 478, 35 L. Ed. 55 (1891).
' U. S. C. A., Title 12, Banks and Banking, §24 (7): "..... To exercise
by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law,
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of ex-
change, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion, by loaning money, on personal security;
and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of
this chapter ......
" Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples National Bank, 144 S. E. 501 (Va. 1928).
People's Bank v. Manufacturers' National Bank, 101 U. S. 181, 25 L. Ed.
907 (Ill. 1879).
'Note 4, supra.
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contractors to whom loans were made became insolvent, and to
guarantee the payment of materialmen ;7 to take over a drug store,
form a partnership, and continue the drug business;8 to actively
engage in the creamery business ;9 to have timber sawed according
to specifications furnished by the purchaser ;1o to buy real estate;l
to enter into the automobile agency business;12 to hold legal title
to gladiola bulbs on trust to liquidate a debt to the bank;18 and to
make other similar agreements. The tendency to allow a national
bank to do what an individual could do in the protection of its busi-
ness seems sound. When it engages in business undertakings other
than those necessary to protect its legitimate interests then existing,
all agreements made in furtherance of such business are ultra vires.
The federal rule, generally adopted in construing the contracts of
national banks, holds that such contracts are absolutely void, not
-because they are immoral in themselves, but because the bank has
no power to make them.14 An executory contract of such a nature
may be repudiated at any time. The plaintiff suing a national bank
,on such a contract, although executed on the part of the plaintiff,
cannot recover, even if he has acted to his detriment. The plaintiff
may recover only on a quantum meruit.15  Even then the plaintiff
must show by direct evidence some benefits to the bank, to the extent
of which its recovery will then be limited.10 "The more plainly
" Note 4, mipra.
' iSnow ill Bank v. Odum Drug Co., 188 N. C. 672, 125 S. E. 394 (1924).
This was not a national bank, however.
'Emich v. Earling, 134 Wis. 565, approved on writ of error in 218 U. S.
27, 30 S. Ct. 672, 54 L. Ed. 915 (1908).
"Patterson & Edy Lumber Co. v. Bank of Mobile, 203 Ala. 536, 84 So.
721, 10 A. L. R. 1037 (1919).
UU. S. C. A., Title 12, Banks and Banking, §29.
"American Exchange National Bank v. Lacy, 188 N. C. 25, 123 S. E.
475 (1924).
'Knowlton v. Fourth Atlantic National Bank, 162 N. E. 356 (Mass. 1928).
"' Note 2, supra. "All contracts made by a corporation beyond the scope
of those powers are unlawful and void, and no action can be maintained upon
them in the courts, and this upon three distinct grounds: The obligation of
every one contracting with a corporation, to take notice of the legal limits
of its powers; the interest of the stockholders, not to be subjected to risks
which they have never undertaken; and, above all, the interest of the public,
that the corporation shall not transcend the powers conferred upon it by law."
'Citizens Central National Bank v. Appleton. 216 U. S. 196, 30 S. Ct.
364, 54 L. Ed. 443 (1910), quoting with approval the case given in note 2,
supra.
"Consolidated National Bank of Tucson v. Anglo and London Paris
National Bank of San Francisco, 269 Pac. 68 (Ariz. 1928) ; Western National
Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U. S. 346, 14 S. Ct. 572, 38 L. Ed. 470 (1893);
Aldrich v. Chem. National Bank, 176 U. S. 18, 20 S. Ct. 498, 44 L. Ed. 611
(1900).
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parties understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature
they place themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that
protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less
inclined will they be to enter into them. '17 The business man should
be wary of contracts with banks, unless he is sure they have power
to make them, for the bank has every advantage, being liable only
for the benefits actually received.
J. W. CREW.
BILLS AND NOTES-CHECKS-PAYMENT UNDER MISTAKE AS
CERTIFICATION-An "order" check given by a tobacco warehouse-
man to a farmer came into the hands of a wrongful holder who pre-
sented it for payment at the drawee bank. The bank in accordance
with a prior written request of the warehouseman to honor all checks
drawn to order just as if they were made payable to bearer, paid it
without requiring any indorsement or identification. And the fanner,
payee, now sues to recover the amount of the check. Held, that the
special authority given could not affect the rights of the payee and
that the conduct of the bank in paying the unindorsed check, re-
taining it, and charging it to the depositor's account, was in effect
an acceptance, rendering the drawee liable to the true owner. Dawson
v. National Bank of Greenville.'
The result reached by the court is undoubtedly correct.2 The
agreement between the drawer and the drawee, although made for
the convenience of the payee (viz: to relieve him from complying
with the requirements of indorsement and identification) should in no
way affect his rights as the holder of an order instrument. There-
fore, the bank should be liable to him for wrongfully paying the
check other than in accordance with its terms. The correctness of
the court's reasoning however, in holding that the bank's conduct
amounted "in effect" to an acceptance is questionable and might
conceivably be productive of undesirable results in other fact
situations.
The view that a mistaken payment and subsequent charging of
a check to the drawer's account amounts to an acceptance, although
1'First National Bank of Maux v. McKown, 176 Pac. 245 (Okla. 1918),
citing McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 669, 19 S. Ct. 851, 43 L. Ed.
1117 (1899).
1Dawson v. First National Bank of Greenville, 196 N. C. 134, 144 S. E.
833 (1928).
'Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. 919 (1890).
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adopted in some states,3 has been criticized by several courts 4 and
by authors. 5 The error of such a view seems to lie in the failure
to distinguish between presentment for payment and presentment for
acceptance. In First National Bank v. Whitman0 Mr. Justice Hunt
says, "The two things are essentially different. One is a promise to
perform an act, the other an actual performance. A bank or an indi-
vidual may be ready to make an actual payment of a check while
unwilling to make a promise to pay at a future time." The unfortu-
nate result which might arise from considering payment an accept-
ance can be illustrated as follows: A drawee bank pays a five hundred
dollar check to a person in wrongful possession and discovers after
charging it to the drawer's account that his balance is only fifty
dollars and that he is insolvent. To consider this mistaken payment
as an acceptance would make the bank liable for another five hun-
dred dollars to the true payee; whereas, to treat it as a payment
only, which it actually was intended to be, would make the bank liable
to the rightful owner only for the value of the instrument so con-
verted.
It is submitted that the bank's conduct in the instant case should
be treated as a conversion, since the section of the N. I. L. concerning
constructive acceptance does not properly apply.7 "The check be-
longed to the plaintiff and if upon demand for its surrender, the bank
refuses to deliver it he would be entitled to redress against the bank
for conversion." 8 While in the present situation there would be no
difference in the result whether the decision was based on acceptance
'Chamberlain Metal, etc., Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 96 Kan. 611, 160
Pac. 1138 (1916); Seventh National Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483, 13 Am.
Rep. 751 (1873); Pickle v. Muse, supra, note 2. Cf. Security Commercial
and Say. Bank of San Diego v. Southern Tr. & Com. Bank, 241 Pac. 945, 74
Cal. App. Rep. 734 (1925).
'First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (1876) ; State Bank of
Chicago v. Mid-City T. & S. Bank, 293 Ill. 599, 129 N. E. 498 (1920) ; Lone
Star Trucking Co. v. City National Bank, 240 S. W. 1000 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1922).
'Brannan, N. I. L. (4th ed. 1926) p. 842; Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill
of Exchange Against Drawee, 38 HARv. LAW Rnv. 856, 878 (1925).
'First National Bank v. Whitman, supra, note 4.
Kentucky Title Savings Bank v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S. W. 667
(1924); Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Ave. Bank, 191 Mo. App.
287, 177 S. W. (1092) (1915) ; Spaulding v. First National Bank, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 492 (1924) ; Bentley, Murray & Co. v. La Salle St. Trust & Say. Bank,
197 Ili. App. 322 (1916) ; Fidelity & D. Co. v. Bank of Charleston, 267 Fed.
367 (C. C. A. 4th 1921); Seigel v. Kevinsky, 157 N. Y. Supp. 340, 93 Misc.
541 (1916).
'Brannan, N. I. L. 4 ed., §189, p. 908 (1926); Kentucky Title Say. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Dunovan, supra note 7.
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or conversion, to be in accord with the better reasoning and to pro-
vide a more comprehensive general rule, the latter view is pre-
ferable.9
LAwRENcE WALLACE.
CONFLICT OF LAWs-DOMICILE-REsIDENCE FOR VOTING--In a
contest for the office of Mayor, plaintiff received one vote less than
defendant. School teachers who remained in the town during the
school term and, in vacation, returned to the homes of their parents
were allowed to vote. The constitution requires every elector to
reside in the district in which he offers to vote. Held, Residence as
here used means domicile and what constitutes domicile is a matter
of law. Thus the court did not err in sustaining plaintiff's objection
to a question asked several of the teachers whether it was their pur-
pose to make the town their legal residence. Go'wer v. Carter.'
When accurately used residence is not synonomous with domicile,2
but its meaning in a legal phrase must be determined in each case.
3
Residence implies the fact of actual abode which is more or less
permanent 4 and may or may not be identical with domicile.5 Domicile
is the residence of a person at a particular place with the intention
to remain there for an indefinite length of time ;6 it is "the place
with which a person has a settled connection for legal purposes,
either because his home is there or because it is assigned to him
by law" ;7 it is "where a man sits down with the thought of remain-
ing".8 Residence for however long a time it may be continued can-
not constitute a person's domicile without the intention of indefinitely
I Note, 14 A. L. R. 764, 768 (1921). And see, going so far as to allow the
drawee to recover in trover from one who collected the check for the wrongful
holder from the drawee bank, Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First Nat. Bk. of
Englewood, 306 Ill. 179, 137 N. E. 793 (1922).
1 Gower v. Carter, 195 N. C. 697, 143 S. E. 513 (1928).
'Town of Roanoke Rapids v. Patterson, 184 N. C. 132, 113 S. E. 603 (1922);
Talley v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 516, 103 S. E. 612 (1920) ; GOODRICH, CON-
FLicr OF LAWS (1927) §18.
'CONFLICr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) §12; GOODRICH, CON-
FLicr OF LAws (1927) §19.
"Beale, Residence and Domicile (1918) 4 Iowa Law Bulletin 1.
'Farmer v. Phillips, 12 Ga. App. 732, 78 S. E. 353 (1913).
'Reynolds v. Cotton Mills, 177 N. C. 412, 99 S. E. 240 (1919) ; Presson v.
Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 147 Pac. 1081 (1915).
CONFLicr oF LAws RESTATEmENT, §10. Cf. Harnon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C.
115 (1883).
'In Re Kalpochnikoff, 28 F. (2d) 288 (E. D. Pa., 1928).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
making it his home,9 or "without any present intention of removing
therefrom."'o
The word resident in the naturalization act," in the poor laws,
12
in the statute of limitations,' 3 in the election laws,' 4 and in statutes
referring to taxation' 5 and jurisdiction's has been held synonymous
with domicile. However, for the purpose of attachment residence
is not identical with domicile but means actual residence.' 7 The
intrepretation must be left to the context and especially to a con-
sideration of the purpose of the statute.'3
The instant case is clearly correct and raises the same problem
which arises when students attempt to vote in university towns. If
the student returns to his father's home during vacations and is
dependent in part or in whole upon his father for support he has no
domicile at the university.' 9 But where an adult student has left
his parent's home and, having no other, has chosen the college town
for his home it is his domicile even though he has no intention of
remaining there indefinitely.
20
" Home v. Home, 31 N. C. 99 (1848) ; Reynolds v. Cotton Mills, s4pra note
4; GOODRICH, CONFLICr oF LAws (1927) §24; but see JAcoBs, LAW oF DOMICiLE,
§171.
"Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488 (1813).
"In re Kalpochnikoff, supra note 6.
'Madison v. Guilford, 85 Conn. 55, 81 At. 1046 (1911) ; State v. Dodge
Co., 56 Wis. 79, 13 N. W. 680 (1882).
"Farrow v. Farrow, 162 Ia. 87, 143 N. W. 856 (1913). Hallet v. Bassett,
100 Mass. 167 (1868). Contra Hunter v. Bremer, 256 Pa. 257, 100 Atd. 809
(1917).
"State v. Grizzard, .upra note 5; Gower v. Carter, 195 N. C. 697, 143 S. E.
513 (1928) ; Moffett v. Hill, 131 11. 239, 22 N. E. 821 (1889) ; Berry v. Wilcox,
44 Neb. 82, 62 N. W. 249 (1895). Cf. State v. Joyce, 123 La. 633, 49 So. 219
(1909).
'Brookover v. Kase, 41 Ind. App. 102, 83 N. E. 524 (1908) ; Pendleton v.
Commonwealth, 110 Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536 (1909).
" Schlawig v. De Peyster, 83 Iowa 323, 49 N. W. 843 (1891). Contra Atkin-
son v. Washington and Jefferson College, 54 W. Va. 32, 46 S. E. 253 (1903).
Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46, 88 Atl. 26 (1913) ; Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S.
561, 35 Sup. Ct. 164, (1914) ; Presson v. Presson, supra note 5.
"Wheeler v. Cobb, 75 N. C. 21 (1876) ; Biggers v. Bank of Ringgold, 144
S. E. 397 (Ga. 1928); Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. v. Swisher, 144 S. E.
294 (W. Va. 1928). One domiciled in a state who is temporarily absent on busi-
ness or pleasure is not a nonresident within meaning of attachment laws.
Brann v. Hanes, 194 N. C. 571, 140 S. E. 292 (1927).
"CONFLICt OF LAws RESTATEMENT §12(1).
,Ibid, §20.
"Ibid, §24(10); Berry v. Wilcox, supra note 13; Klutts v. Jones, 21 N. M.
720, 158 Pac. 490 (1916) school teachers; People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 143,
135 N. W. 921 (1912).
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A model charge in student cases may be found in a carefully
framed opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
as follows:
"If he has a father living; if he still remains a member of his
father's family; if he returns to pass his vacation; if he is main-
tained and supported by his father; these are strong circumstances,
repelling the presumption of a change of domicil. . . . But if, having
a father or mother, they should remove to the town where the college
is situated, and he should still remain a member of the family of the
parent; or if, having no parent, or being separated from his father's
family, not being maintained or supported by him; or, if he has a
family of his own, and removes with them to such town; or .by pur-
chase or lease takes up his permanent abode there, without intending
to return to his former domicil; if he depend on his own property,
income or industry for his support ;--these are circumstances, more
or less conclusive, to show a change of domicil, and the acquisition of
a domicil in the town where the college is situated. In general, it
may be said that an intent to change one's domicil and place of abode
is not so readily presumed from a residence at a public institution
for the purpose of education, for a given length of time, as it would
be from a like removal from one town to another, and residing there
for the ordinary purposes of life; and therefore stronger facts and
circumstances must concur to establish the proof of change of domi-
cil, in the one case than in the other. But where the proofs of change
of domicil, drawn from the various sources already indicated, are
such as to overcome the presumption of the continuance of the
prior domicil, such preponderance of proof, concurring with an actual
residence of the student in the town where the public institution is
situated, will be sufficient to establish his domicil, and give him a right
to vote in that town, with other municipal rights and privileges."'
S. SHARP.
CRIMINAL LAw-ABANDONMENT-ALTERNATIVE AND CONDI-
TIONAL JUDGMNTs-In a recent North Carolina case, the defendant
was convicted of the abandonment of his wife and minor children.
He was ordered to pay into court $90.00 monthly for their support,
to give bond in the sum of $1000.00 to secure these payments, and
to be confined in the county jail for two years, capias not to issue,
however, unless the defendant defaulted in his monthly payments.
Held, judgment affirmed, subject to modifications in two minor par-
ticulars. State v Vickers.1
" Opinion of Justices, 5 Met. 587, 589 (Mass. 1843).
'State v. Vickers, 196 N .C. 239, 145 S. E. 175 (1928).
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The North Carolina statute2 provides that upon conviction in
abandonment cases, the trial judge may at his discretion make such
order as will in his judgment best provide for the support of the
wife and children, out of the property or earnings of the defendant.
Frequently, in practice, these orders are ambiguous and indefinite.
Thus, in the principal case, the trial judge was directed to make
the judgment more definite as to the duration of the period of pay-
ments and as to the amount to be paid when the children reached
majority.
It was contended by defense counsel in the principal case that
the judgment was bad as being a suspended judgment and as being
in the alternative. The term suspended judgment is used in two
distinct senses. In one, the trial court postpones for a time, which
may be either of definite or indefinite duration, the pronouncement
of sentence.3 In the other, sentence is pronounced immediately, but
the execution is delayed. 4 Both types are resorted to in order to
grant the defendant an opportunity to comply with various condi-
tions, whose performance will relieve him from further penalty.
This distinction, however, is not a limitation upon the discretionary
power of the trial judge in abandonment cases. He may use either
plan, as seems best in the particular case.
On the other hand, the courts have not as a rule upheld, either in
criminal cases or in civil cases at common law, judgments in the
alternative.5 Thus, in a prosecution for forcible trespass, an order
to make restitution of personal property or to go to jail was held
improper.0 Similarly, in a prosecution for assault to commit rape
an order to pay a fine or to go to jail was found similarly defective.7
Likewise, a judgment for plaintiff in an action for the possession of
land, was held invalid because it was to be stricken out if defendant
filed a certain bond within a designated period.8 The reason usually
given is the historical requirement of definiteness and certainty in
common-law judgments. In equitable proceedings, however, con-
2N. C., C. S. (1919), §4449; CODE (1927) §4449.
'State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) ; note (1911) 33 L. R
A. (N. S.) 112. The enforcement of the suspended sentence is discussed in
(1923) 1 N. C. L. REv. 116.
' State v. Schlichter, 194 N. C. 277, 139 S. E. 448 (1927).
'BIsHOP, Nsw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (2 ed. 1913), §1307; FREEMAN, JUDG-
MENTs, (5 ed. 1925), §79.
'State v. Bennet, 20 N. C. 170 (1838).
State v. Perkins, 82 N. C. 682 (1880).
'Puette v. Mull, 175 N. C. 535, 95 S. E. 881, (1918) ; Strickland v. Cox, 102
N. C. 411, 9 S. E. 414, (1889) ; In re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, (1890).
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ditional and alternative decrees and orders have always been upheld.9
The statute providing for the handling of abandonment cases seems
to have contemplated the incorporation of this characteristic of the
decree, by the consolidation of a sort of equitable specific performance
of the marital duty of support with the sanctions of the criminal
law.10
The question, therefore, is not whether the judgment is in the
alternative, but whether the trial court abused its discretion in secur-
ing the obedience of its order for support of the payments both by the
filing of a bond and by the suspended execution of a criminal sen-
tence. Actually, the order in the principal case was in the alternative
in the extreme. Technically, this was not so. The election between
the imprisonment of the defendant and the collection of the bond, or
both, was not the privilege of the defendant, but of the family. And
there was only one punishment provided, the jail sentence. The
double sanction, it is submitted, was not too harsh. For, upon default,
jailing the defendant would not assure the continuance of the family's
support. The bond, however, provided a resource for this purpose.
The affirmance of the judgment in its more important aspects, there-
fore, represents a liberal interpretation of the apparent purpose of
the statute.
N. S. SOWERS.
RAILROADS-RIGHT-OF-WAY-NATURE AND EXTENT OF EASE-
MENT-INJUNCTIONS-The plaintiff granted to the defendant rail-
road company a right-of-way over his land, with a provision in the
deed that the company might make necessary erections and do all
other things necessary and convenient for the operation of the rail-
road. The defendant fenced in the land, built thereon a shanty for
its employees, and signified its intention to erect other houses. The
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from carrying out these pro-
jects and from cultivating the land. The lower court granted the
injunction with the proviso that the company might use the com-
pleted shanty until "final hearing". The Supreme Court disallowed
the injunction except as to prohibiting cultivation. Hodges v
A. C. L. Ry.1
'Daughtry v. Reddick, 40 N. C. 261, (1848); FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, (5 ed.
1925), §79.
0 Compare N. C., C. S. (1919), §1667; CODE (1927) §1667; State v. Faulk-
ner, 185 N. C. 635, 116 S. E. 168, (1923) ; and Dye v. Dye, 9 Colo. App. 320, 48
Pac. 313, (1879).
'Hodges v. A. C. L. Ry., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E., 528 (1928).
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In a case like this, the chief question is what is necessary for
carrying out the purposes of the grant. The land is supposed to be
used for nothing except the purposes of the grant.2 That an injunc-
tion may be granted in cases of improper use of a right of way is
well established.3 Whether the use is necessary or not is primarily
a question for the railroad company to decide.4 The courts have
authorized railroads to do anything which will facilitate transpor-
tation.5 They may permit the installation of a telegraph line which
will serve the railroad,6 make fills necessary for the maintenance of
a safe road-bed regardless of the natural drainage of the land,7 ele-
vate the tracks,8 and make such other changes in the land as may be
necessary to its reasonable use.9 However, they may not excavate
dirt for purposes of sale,10 dig pits beyond the narrow limits neces-
sary to the maintenance of the road-bed, or remove any part of the
land to the land of another," even though the excavated dirt is to
be used for the completion of fills at other places.'
2
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the authorities
cited above. Houses for employees are certainly necessary for the
operation of a railroad, and in erecting them the company acted in
good faith and within its rights. The use of the right of way for
agricultural purposes is unnecessary and the company denied that
they ever had any such intention; so the court was correct in sus-
taining this part of the restraining order.
CHARLEs S. MANGUM, JR.
WILLS-MUTUAL AND RECIPROCAL WILLS-RELIEF AGAINST
REVOCATION-In the recent Georgia case of Clernents v. Jones,' it
appeared that one Walker (whose heirs and next of kin are the
'Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. McWhorter, 202 Ala. 455, 80 So. 839
(1919).
Robertson v. Bertha Mineral Co., 128 Va. 93, 104 S. E. 832 (1920).
Hodges v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572
(1903).
' Hales v. A. C. L. Ry., 172 N. C. 104, 90 S. E. 11 (1916).
' Chatham R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906).
'Hohl v. Iowa Cent. Ry., 162 Ia. 66, 143 N. W. 850 (1913).
'American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Smith, 71 Md. 535, 18 Atl. 910 (1889).
Cited and approved in Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co. Supra note 2.
'Harrelson v. Kansas City and A. Ry., 151 Mo. 482, 52 S. W. 368 (1899).
'Gillespie v. Buffalo, R. and P. Ry., 226 Pa. 31, 74 Atl. 738 (1909).
" Whitewater Lumber Co. v. Prather, 211 Ala. 361, 100 So. 549 (1924).
"Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry. v. Karthaus, 150 Ala. 633, 43 So. 791 (1907).
" Whitewater Lumber Co. v. Prather, supra note 9.
"Hendrix v. Southern Ry. 162 N. C. 9, 77 S. E. 1001 (1913).
' 144 S. E. 319 (Ga. 1928).
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plaintiffs) and the defendant (his step-mother), on the same day
and before the same witnesses, executed their respective wills, in
which each devised and bequeathed to the other, real and personal
property. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that this was done "as part of
a general scheme" between the testators, and that the will of the
the deceased "had as its consideration the execution and publication of
the will of the defendant." Upon a demurrer to a petition seeking
that the defendant be enjoined from conveying the property received
under the will of the deceased, and that a trust for the benefit of
the plaintiffs be impressed upon the property embraced in the
defendant's will, it was held that the judgment of the trial court,
sustaining the demurrer, must be affirmed, for failure on the part
of the plaintiff to allege the existence of a clear and definite contract.
In most of the litigation involving relief against a threatened
revocation of wills, whether single, joint,2 or mutual and reciprocal
wills,3 the parties plaintiff have been persons designated in the will
as beneficiaries. 4 The principal case is unique, in-that the plaintiffs
were not thus mentioned in either will. The court does not discuss
their status. They may, however, have had an interest because of
other allegations relating to fraud in the inducement to execute a
certain contemporaneous deed. Even so, it is hard to see how the
plaintiffs had any claim upon the carrying out of the alleged obli-
gation of the defendant to abide by her will. Thus, in contrast with
the principal case, many of the decisions in this field have dealt with
a situation where the testators had willed their property to each other
for life, with remainder over.5 Others have been cases where it was
the deceased who had broken the supposed contract, and the survivor
was claiming against heirs or other devisees. 6
'See Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37, 2 A. L. R. 1155 (1918).
'For general discussion see Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216,
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, 17 Ann. Cas. 1003 (1909) ; Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky.
394, 285 S. W. 188 (1926) ; (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 246; E. C. Goddard,
Mutual Wills, (1919) 17 MIcH. L. REY. 677.
" See annotation (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1193, 1200, for a collection of cases.
'Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910) ; In re Roll's Estate,
193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924) ; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40
N. W. 173, 1 L. R. A. 596, 16 Am. St. Rep. 528 (1888); Rastetter v. Hoennin-
ger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915) ; Phillip v. Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, 160 N.
Y. Supp. 624 (1916) ; Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E. 696 (1919);
Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763, 33 A. L. R. 733 (1924).
'Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943 (1921) ; Menke v. Dewve,
117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924) ; Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac.
927, 43 A. L. R. 1010 (1925) ; Hadwen v. Myles, [1925] 1 Ch. 75, 132 L. T. R.
658 (1925).
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Where mutual and reciprocal wills contain internal evidence that
each has been executed in consideration of the execution of the
other, according to a definite contract, all courts agree that relief
may be had against threatened or actual revocation of either will.
Similarly, in the situation where, outside of the text of the wills,
the parties have entered into an express contract to make such a testa-
mentary disposition of their property.7 If that contract has not
been in writing, and the wills have disposed of land, two grounds
have been resorted to in order to obviate the difficulty of the Statute
of Frauds. One is that the wills themselves constitute the contract
for this purpose.8 The other is the doctrine of part performance,
operating upon the death of one testator and the receipt by the other
of benefits under his will.9
A few courts have found sufficient evidence of the existence of
a contract in the mere facts of simultaneous execution of the wills
and of close family relationship between the testators.' 0 Especially
has this been so where the two wills have been embodied in one
jointly executed instrument.11 Most courts, however, have insisted
upon more unequivocal circumstances, when an express contract
could not be shown, before they have been willing to find a contract
implied in fact.' 2 The North Carolina court has adopted this view.' 8
'See annotation (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1020, 1024, for a collection of cases.
'Brown v. Johanson, supra note 6.
'Carmichael v. Carmichael, supra note 5; Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S. W.
395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ; see E. C. Goddard, op. cit. supra note 3, at 683;
PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS (2d. ed. 1926) §95; (1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 315.
0 See Stevens v. Myers, supra note 2, where the testator and his wife
executed mutual wills of identical import, leaving property to each other, and
expressing the purpose that when they both should die their son and daughter
should have all of their property. On the theory that the mere execution of
such wills proves their contractual character, the testator, who survived the
wife and took her property, was prevented from making another will and
thereby disinheriting his daughter. Accord: Brown v. Johanson, supra note 6.
' Frazier v. Patterson, supra note 3. There are numerous cases to the
effect that the terms of a joint will, or the circumstances under which it was
executed, may show the existence of a contract, directly or by inference.
Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153 N. W. 56 (1915) ; Rastetter v.
Hoenninger, supra note 5; Doyle v. Fischer, supra note 5.
Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 50 N. E. 265 (1898) is a leading case.
Two sisters made similar wills at the same time, bequeathing their property to
each other, and making their brother the ultimate residuary legatee. After
the death of one the survivor made a different will. Upon the latter's death
the brother sought to establish the provisions of the first will, as a contract be-
tween the sisters ultimately to give their property to him. It was held that the
circumstances failed to establish such a contract. See annotation (1926) 43
A. L. R_ 1020, 1027, for a collection of cases.
"3See Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696 (1917), and cases
there cited.
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The court in the principal case would therefore seem to be sup-
ported by the great weight of authority in being unable to find any
allegation that the defendant was under contract either in the allega-
tion that the wills were executed as part of a general scheme, or in
that reciting that the deceased had received a consideration for making
his will. Moreover, the parties were not, as has usually been the
case, husband and wife; and the wills were not embraced within a
single instrument. And the court was probably reluctant, as between
the uncles and aunts of the decedent and his specific devisee, to upset
a disposition made under a will apparently free from fraud or undue
influence, while probate was pending.
CHARLES F. RousE.
